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SUMMARIES
Using the new historiography of science as a touch-
stone, the historiography of mathematics is examined. Ten
"laws" concerning patterns of conceptual change in
mathematics are then suggested.
En se servant de la nouvelle historiographie de science
comme pierre de touche, on examine l'historiographie des
mathematiques. On suggere ensuite dix "lois" sur les
formes de changements de concepts mathematiques.
Approximately a decade ago G. Buchdahl [1965, 69] stated that
I~e are finding ourselves at present in a revolution in the
historiography of science." No one has announced a revolution
in the historiography of mathematics, even though the number of
excellent historical studies of mathematics has increased of
late. Whereas the present state of the historiography of
mathematics differs little (except in quality) from what it was
nearly a century ago when M. Cantor published the first volume
of his Vorlesungen, the historiography of science has undergone
far reaching changes which are most explicitly set out in the
writings of such authors as J. Agassi and T. Kuhn (whose books
Buchdahl was reviewing) as well as in the publications of N.R.
Hanson, K. Popper, and S. Toulmin.
In the historiography of mathematics, no comparable group of
authors seems to have emerged. Moreover, most historians of
mathematics acquainted with the new historiography of science
have been skeptical as to whether the insights embodied therein
can be applied in any direct way to the historiography of
mathematics. The writings of these five authors do not facili-
tate such application, for their works contain few references
to, and generally have been written without detailed considera-
tion of, the history of mathematics. Moreover, the major
differences between the conceptual structures of mathematics
and of science make it questionable whether their histories
should exhibit similar patterns of development.
The situation may, however, be changing. The late Imre
Lakatos' "Proofs and refutations" [1963] and Raymond Wilder's
Evolution of Mathematical Concepts [1968] are examples of works
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that may pave the way to a new historiography of mathematics.
Moreover, the October 1974 History of Science Society meeting
included a session which explored various questions in the
historiography of mathematics, especially whether the ideas in
T. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions could fruitfully
be applied in the history of mathematics. Much may be at ?take
here, for the revolution in the historiography of science brought
with it not only an increased accessibility for history of
science writing and teaching as well as raising thorny questions
in the philosophy of science, but also produced new and more
sophisticated standards in the historical study of science.
The present paper has been written to stimulate discussion of
the historiography of mathematics by asserting ten "laws"
concerning change in mathematics, which touch on issues that
will have to be considered if a new historiography of mathematics
is to develop. R.L. Wilder [1968, 207-209] in his interesting
Evolution of Mathematical Concepts has suggested and evidenced
ten "laws," which he believes "worthy of study with a view to
their justification or refutation." The following ten "laws,"
suggested in the same spirit, differ in their origin from
Professor Wilder's chiefly in that they have arisen from my
efforts to apply the insights of the new historiography to mathe-
matics, whereas Professor Wilder draws upon anthropological and
sociological researches. More substantive research in the
history of mathematics than can be cited in the present format
has provided me with the differing measures of confidence with
which these "laws" have been set down; for some of this evidence,
see [Crowe 1967a], although that book was written long before I
had formulated many of the ideas contained in the present paper.
1. New mathematical concepts frequently come forth not at the
bidding, but against the efforts, at times strenuous efforts,
of the mathematicians who create them.
Consider Saccheri, whose valiant efforts to prove that no
geometry but Euclid's was possible resulted in the first non-
Euclidean system. Or consider Hamilton, who sought for a three
dimensional commutative, associative, and distributive division
algebra, but who in a long and stubborn pursuit of this goal
invented the four dimensional quaternions.
2. Many new mathematical concepts, even though logically accept-
able, meet forceful resistance after their appearance and
achieve acceptance only after an extended period of time.
The discovery of incommensurable segments by Hippasus led,
we are told, to his banishment and to death by shipwreck. More
than legends tell us that numbers representing incommensurable
ratios were only fully accepted 2,200 years later. Invective
was a major part of the response of the mathematical community
between 1543 and the 1830's to the s~uare roots of negative
quanti ties. Such terms as "sophistic" (Cardan), "nonsense"
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(Napier), "inexplicable" (Girard), "imaginary" (Descartes),
"incomprehensible" (Huygens), and "impossible" (many authors)
remind us of the type of welcome accorded these new en~ities.
3. Although the demands of logic, consistency, and rigor have
at times urged the rejection of some concepts now accepted,
the usefulness of these concepts has repeatedly forced
mathematicians to accept and to tolerate them, even in the
face of strong feelings of discomfort.
As Felix Klein suggested, "imaginary numbers made their
own way ... without the approval, and even against the desires of
individual mathematicians, and obtained wider circulation only
gradually and to the extent to which they showed themselves
useful" [1939, 56]. For more than a century mathematicians
accepted imaginary numbers without a formal justification for
them because they proved useful in saving the fundamental theorem
of algebra and in permitting the solution of various scientific
problems. Or consider the case of our modern scalar and vector
products which arose not on principle or from conscious desire,
but rather from the practice among quaternionists of using
separately the scalar and vector parts of the full quaternion
product.
4. The rigor that permeates the textbook presentations of many
areas of mathematics was frequently a late acquisition in
the historical development of those areas and was frequently
forced upon, rather than actively sought by, the pioneers in
those fields.
As J. Grabiner has recently shown, the early development
of rigorous approaches in analysis was in large measure the
result of bothersome questions raised by impatient students, the
penetrating critique of an aggrieved theologian (Berkeley), the
embarrassment emerging from comparisons with a (then) accepted
model of rigor (Euclid), and the need for generalization
[Grabiner 1967]. The brilliant study of the history of the
Euler conjecture for polyhedra by I. Lakatos [1963-64] showed
no less clearly the elusiveness of the search for rigor. And on
a more general level, Morris Kline [1974, 69] has remarked:
"It is safe to say that no proof given at least up to 1800 in
any area of mathematics, except possibly in the theory of numbers,
would be regarded as satisfactory by the standards of 1900. The
standards of 1900 are not acceptable today."
5. The "knowledge" possessed by mathematicians concerning
mathematics at any point in time is multilayered. A "meta-
physics" of mathematics, frequently invisible to the mathe-
matician yet expressed in his wri tingff and teaching in ways
more subtle than simple declarative sentences, has existed
and can be uncovered in historical research or becomes
~pparent in mathematical controversy.
The existence of this "metaphysics" is suggested by the
164 M.J. Crowe HM2
terms mentioned above which were applied to complex numbers. Or
consider Leibniz's 1702 [Klein 1939, 56] remark that "Imaginaries
are a fine and wonderful refuge of the divine spirit, almost an
amphibian between being and nonbeing." As late as 1887 Eugen
Dlihring [1887, 547] criticized mathematicians for the use of
the imaginary numbers, "this darling of complex mysticism." If
metaphysics seems to strong a word here, let "intuitive knowledge"
be substituted.
6. The fame of the creator of a new mathematical concept has a
powerful, almost a controlling, role in the acceptance of
that mathematical concept, at least if the new concept breaks
wi th tradi tion .
Compare the reception accorded Hamilton's Lectures on
Quaternions (1853) with that of Grassmann's Ausdehnungslehre
(1844). Both are among the classics of mathematics, yet the
work of the former author, who was already famous for empirically
confirmed results, was greeted with lavish praise in reviews by
authors who had not read his book, whereas the book of Grassmann,
an almost unpublished high school teacher, received but one
review (by its author!) and found, before it was used for waste
paper in the early 1860's, only a handful of readers. Or
consider the fate of Lobachevsky and Bolyai, whose publications
remained as unknown as their authors until, thirty years after
their publications, some posthumously published letters of the
illustrious Gauss led mathematicians to take an interest in non-
Euclidean geometry.
7. New mathematical creations frequently arise within, and
depend in the mind of their creators upon, contexts far
larger than the preserved content of these creations; yet
these contexts, for all their original importance, may
impede or even prohibit the acceptance of the creations
until they are removed by the mathematical community.
Gifts arrive in wrappings which must be torn asunder
before the gift itself may be used or even seen. The algebraic
gifts of Hamil ton and Grassmann arrived in philosophic wrappings
which at first obscured the view of the mathematical community,
and then were unceremoniously discarded. Yet these wrappings
were a necessary condition in the minds of Hamilton and Grassmann
for their own acceptance of the gifts of their fertile imagina-
tions, and were scarcely seen by them as distinguishable from
the gifts themselves. The fates of Berkeley and of Boole were
not dissimilar.
8. Multiple independent discoveries of mathematical concepts
are the rule, not the exception.
A striking illustration comes from the history of attempts
to justify complex numbers where no less than eight mathematicians
are cited as discoverers of the two main methods. The multiple
discoverers of analytic geometry, the calculus and non-Euclidean
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geometry are well known. This law is partially explained by
laws 2 and 7.
9. Mathematicians have always possessed a vast repertoire of
techniques for dissolving or avoiding the problems produced
by apparent logical contradictions and thereby preventing
crises in mathematics.
Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions exhibits many
of the strategies which scientists have used to prevent "anoma-
lies" from becoming crisis-producing contradictions or refutations.
That the mathematician's cabinet is no less richly stored was
amply illustrated by Lakatos' "Proofs and refutations," wherein
"monster-barring" is but the most colorfully named technique.
Or, to turn to an early period of mathematics, was the discovery
of the incommensurable a discovery that the irrational magnitude
is not part of arithmetic or that algebra was not a fit branch
of mathematics or that Hippasus was not a fit mathematician?
10. Revolutions never occur in mathematics.
Surprising as this "law" may seem to some, it is the
conclusion of mathematicians as widely separated in time as J.B.
Fourier, H. Hankel, and C. Truesdell. As Fourier [1953, 7]
wrote in his 1822 Theorie analytique de la chaleur, "this diffi-
cult science [mathematics] is formed slowly, but it preserves
every principle it has once acquired; it grows and strengthens
itself in the midst of many variations and errors of the human
mind." Hankel wrote no less forcefully when in 1869 he stated:
"In most sciences one generation tears down what another has
built .... In mathematics alone each generation builds a new
story to the old structure" [Moritz 1942, 14]. And more recently
Truesdell [1968, Foreword], who like Hankel wrote with a detailed
knowledge of both mathematics and its history, stated that
"while 'imagination, fancy, and invention' are the soul of mathe-
matical research, in mathematics there has never yet been a
revolution." Yet these quotations, however impressive their
authors, cannot stand alone and without qualification. For this
law depends upon at least the minimal stipulation that a neces-
sary characteristic of a revolution is that some previously
existing entity (be it king, constitution, or theory) must be
overthrown and irrevocably discarded. I have argued more fully
elsewhere [1967b] that a number of the most important develop-
ments in science, though frequently called "revolutionary," lack
this fundamental characteristic. My argument was based on a
distinction between "transformational" or revolutionary discov-
eries (astronomy "transformed" from Ptolemaic to Copernican) and
"formational" discoveries (wherein new areas are "formedll or
created without the overthrow of previous doctrines, e.g. energy
conservation or spectroscopy). It is, I believe, the latter
process rather than the former which occurs in the history of
mathematics. For example, Euclid was not deposed by, but reigns
along with, the various non-Euclidean geometries. Also the
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stress in law 10 on the preposition "in" is crucial, for, as a
number of the earlier laws make clear, revolutions may occur in
mathematical nomenclature, symbolism, metamathematics (e.g. the
metaphysics of mathematics), methodology (e.g. standards of
rigor), and perhaps even in the historiography of mathematics.
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